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PRIVACY IN PHOTOGRAPHS: MISCONCEPTION
SINCE INCEPTION
The common law concept of privacy has suffered a confused
advocacy since its inception.' The right to privacy, described as the
right to be let alone, 2 or the right to individual autonomy, 3 was originally intended to protect one's dignity and to prevent the public
disclosure of private matters. 4 This concept of privacy, however,
has been expanded by legal scholars and courts to include interests
far beyond those imagined at its inception.5 The field of photography, as it relates to privacy, has suffered as a result, in that personal
dignity is not the focus in privacy suits involving photographs. Because such privacy cases are determined solely on the location of
the taking, 6 the conduct of the photographer,7 or the content of the
photograph,8 photography has been placed under a stricter judicial
scrutiny than most forms of expression. 9
The legal concept of privacy was originally intended to protect
a person's dignity far beyond that which can be captured on film.10
It has developed, however, in an entirely different direction, and
1. The common law tort of privacy was said to have been barn in an article
written in 1890. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890). See infra notes 12-33 and accompanying text for historical background. Since the birth of privacy, it has been highly advocated and criticized.
See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTs § 117 (5th ed. 1984);
Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutionalas Well?, 46 TEx. L. REV. 611 (1968); Kalven,
Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).
2. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
3. Comment, Publicity as an Aspect of Privacy and PersonalAutonomy,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (1982).
4. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1.
5. See infra notes 23-33 and accompanying text for historical background.
6. See infra notes 46-70 and accompanying text for discussion on location.
7. See infra notes 71-94 and accompanying text for discussion on conduct.
8. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text for discussion on content.
9. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198. "The existence of this
right [to privacy] does not depend upon the particular method of expression
adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by word or by signs, in painting, by
sculpture, or in music." Id.
10. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205. The protection of
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions is an instance of an individual's right to be
let alone.
Invading privacy is most often thought of as discovering information
through private files, breaking into one's home or tapping one's phone. E.g.,
Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3rd Cir. 1936) (unauthorized prying into
bank account); Young v. Western & A.R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414
(1929) (search without warrant); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46
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now includes interests effectively protected under other existing
torts such as trespass, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress."1 In light of this expanded protection, as well as the
infringing effect it has on the photographer's right to free expression, privacy needs to be more strictly defined. By clarifying the
privacy cause of action, photographers will be better able to determine whether their photographs are within the limits of the law. A
clearer definition will also provide the courts a basis with which to
determine privacy cases more consistently.
This comment, after a brief historical perspective on privacy,
compares the photograph to the written word and lays an important
foundation for determining violations of privacy in photography
cases. Thereafter, it examines the expansive privacy interests and
how they are better protected under different causes of action. Finally, this comment suggests limits within which photography cases
may be appropriately adjudicated as an invasion of privacy.
PRIVACY: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The privacy cause of action originated through the efforts of
two Bostonian attorneys, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.1 2 Warren, accustomed to a rather lavish lifestyle, became the
subject of many explicitly uninvited reportings in the SaturdayEvening Gazette.'3 Distressed by extensive press coverage, Warren and
Brandeis developed the right of privacy in an article for which "the
advertisers and the entertainment industry of America were to pay
14
dearly over the next seventy years.'
According to Warren and Brandeis, privacy is defined in terms
of inviolate personality. 15 Although their definition does not expressly describe the protected interest of personality, it does articulate what it is not. 16 They asserted that the scope of privacy does
(1931) (phone tapping). The taking or publishing of a photograph, however,
does not invade one's privacy.
11. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980).
The privacy rhetoric is misleading. When a case suggests that privacy has been
invaded, other interests are always found. When we look beyond the semantics,
we find that privacy is not being protected at all. If privacy is to be a useful
concept, it must be distinct and coherent. Id.
12. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1.
13. A. MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946).
14. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
15. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205. What has in the past been
dealt with as a property interest is not really that at all. Rather, it is an interest
in emotion and sensation. The laws which protect personal writings and productions against publication are laws protecting one's personality. Id.
16. Id. at 214. Warren and Brandeis noted in their article that it would be
difficult to determine the exact boundaries of this right to privacy. This difficulty exists because the exact line where individual dignity and convenience
gives way to public welfare cannot be determined in advance. Id.
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not include matters that are in the public interest, privileged, or
published orally or with consent. 17 Nevertheless, Warren and
Brandeis intended privacy to be a distinct, independent right protecting feeling, intimacy, and dignity; they did not intend it to be a
18
tort incorporating these interests as they relate to other torts.
From the few legal precedents supporting their view, Warren
and Brandeis were able to develop the individual right of privacy. 19
The use of photographs became the first area included in the privacy progeny when New York passed a law making it a misdemeanor and a tort to use someone's name or picture for trade
purposes without first obtaining consent. 20 Two years later, the
Supreme Court of Georgia became the first court to recognize a personal right to privacy in a person's name and photograph.21 This
decision marked the beginning of a movement by the courts to pro22
tect a personal privacy interest.
In 1960, Dean Prosser classified over three hundred privacy
cases. 23 In doing so, he identified four distinct torts:24 intrusion
26
upon the plaintiff's seclusion; 25 public disclosure of private facts;
17. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-18.
18. Id. at 205.
19. Id. at 202 (citing Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652 (1849)).
In PrinceAlbert v. Strange, a London printer attained some of the Queen's amateur etchings and published them without her consent. The Prince Consort
sued and the court enjoined publication on the theory of the Queen's right to
control the etchings because of a common law copyright. Id.
20. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1921). The legislature
acted in response to the decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171
N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). Roberson involved a young girl whose photograph
was used on flour advertisements without her consent. The court held that she
had no remedy, and noted that it was up to the legislature to establish a remedy
which would contest the right to use another's picture for advertising purposes
without authorization. Id. Using New York as a model, other states have
adopted similar statutes. E.g. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1 to .3 (West
Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-401 to 406 (1978); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-377 to 386 (1979). Other states adopting a privacy statute include Nebraska, NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211 (1983), and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West
Supp. 1979). The only state not recognizing a right of privacy in some form or
another as of 1980 was Rhode Island. See generally Note, Tort Recovery for
Invasion of Privacy, 59 NEB. L. REV. 808 (1980).
21. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 192, 50 S.E. 68, 71
(1905) (plaintiff's name and picture in an advertisement constituted an invasion
of privacy).
22. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
Pavesich became the leading case in accepting the views of Warren and Brandeis and recognizing the distinct right of privacy.
23. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
24. Id. Prosser found that since Pavesich, nearly every state had considered
whether a right to privacy existed. In piecing together these cases, four torts
rather than one emerged. Prosser noted, however, that because of overlapping
within the four torts, confusion may occur. Id. at 389.
25. Prosser, supra note 23, at 389. This tort includes intruding into a home,
hospital room or telephone conversation. Surveillance and trespass are forms
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publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light;27 and appropriation of
plaintiff's name or likeness for profit.28 Since 1960, thousands of
cases have been squeezed into these four specific categories.
Dean Prosser's classifications expanded the parameters of privacy far beyond those set forth by Warren and Brandeis. 29 In addition to the individual's dignity interest, which was originally sought
to be protected, Prosser borrowed elements from other torts to produce a right to privacy that protects one's reputation, mental distress, and property. 30 Rather than developing as an independent
right protecting an individual from uninvited publication of private
facts, the right to privacy has grown to encompass myriad situations. 3 1 The intermingling of Prosser's four privacy torts has
caused judicial inconsistency as to what constitutes an invasion of
of intrusion. E.g., Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (intrusion
by means of wire tapping).
26. Prosser, supra note 23, at 392. Prosser asserts that public disclosure of
embarrassing facts is the tort with which Warren and Brandeis were primarily
concerned. Disclosures include: publication of a debt, publication of disfigurements and publication of one's past. E.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806 (2d Cir. 1940) (a one time child prodigy whose later life as an unknown
recluse was disclosed). See also Brezanson, Public Disclosuresas News: Injunctive Relief and Newsworthiness in Privacy Actions Involving the Press, 64 IOWA
L. REV. 1073 (1979).
27. Prosser, supra note 23, at 398. False light occurs where, through the
unintentional use of names, fictionalization, or misuse of name and pictures, a
person is falsely portrayed to the public. E.g., Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co.,
207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1955) (an honest taxi driver's photograph was
used to illustrate a story about crooked cabbies). Warren and Brandeis did not
have this form of privacy in mind when drafting their article.
28. Prosser, supra note 23, at 401. Prosser indicated that Warren and Brandeis did not intend that invasion of privacy include appropriation. E.g., Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
29. See Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farwell to Warren
and Brandeis'PrivacyTort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 296 (1983). In addition to
cases clearly in the Warren-Brandeis mold, Prosser identified others such as
intrusion, appropriation and false light. Privacy has been expanded to situations unlike those considered by Warren and Brandeis.
30. See Gavison, Privacyand the Limits ofLaw, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980)
(other interests are always involved in right to privacy cases). See also Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964), arguing that there is no distinctive single value
or interest that the four torts protect, that each protects a different interest.
"The interest protected by each of these torts is: in the intrusion cases, the
interest in freedom from mental distress, in the public disclosure and 'false
light' cases, the interest in reputation, and in appropriation cases, the proprietary interest in name and likeness." Id. at 965. But see Stolijar, A Re-examination of Privacy, 4 LEGAL STUD. 67, 68 (1984) (individual liberty, common to all
personal wrongs, connects the tort of privacy with other torts).
31. See Bloustein, supra note 30, at 965. For a state by state listing of common law recognition of some of Prosser's categories, see 1 COMMUNICATIONS
LAW 789-819 (1982).
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privacy. 32 As a result, courts look at an individual's interests in reputation or property, rather than at whether publication of private
33
facts has intruded upon the individual's dignity.
THE PHOTOGRAPHY PARADOX

The use of photographs has become the focus of much privacy
litigation. In reality, however, there are few instances in which a
34
All other privacy
photograph can invade an individual's privacy.
35
torts.
other
of
restatements
applications are mere
The camera must be viewed as an extension of the public eye
and the photograph as its by-product. The spoken word is a viable
form of expression even without consent. The same must also be
true for the photograph.3 6 For example, every time an individual
steps into public view or invites another into his home, his appearance, words or actions are capable of descriptive repetition by the
observer. Such repetition is permissible without limitation so long
as it is not defamatory. 37 A photograph, being another form of repetitive expression, should be evaluated under the same standard as
the spoken or written word and should usually not result in an invasion of privacy. 38 An understanding of this basic premise provides the foundation upon which privacy interests in photography
cases must be analyzed.
ERRORS OF THE PAST CREATE PROBLEMS IN THE PRESENT
39
It is a citizen's
Generally, the operation of a camera is lawful.
privilege to take pictures as a civil right under the United States

32. See Bloustein, supra note 30, at 962. In 1956 a federal judge said privacy
was as confused as a "haystack in a hurricane." Etore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Co., 229 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1956).
33. See Bloustein, supra note 30, at 965.
34. See infra notes 105-31 and accompanying text for those situations
where a privacy action may be a viable avenue for plaintiffs.
35. Bloustein, supra note 30, at 966. "If Dean Prosser is correct, there is no
'new tort' of invasion of privacy, there are rather only new ways of committing
'old torts.'" Id.
36. Warren and Brandeis said the method of expression is immaterial.
Therefore, all methods should be treated equally. Warren and Brandeis, supra
note 1, at 199.
37. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 217. "The law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the
absence of special damages." Id. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF ToRrs §§ 111-116 (5th ed. 1984).
.38. Contra Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 217. As long as the statements were oral, it spread over a very small area. Thus, oral publications may
not result in an invasion of privacy under the Warren and Brandeis theory.
39. United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897, 898 (1954).
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Constitution. 40 However, courts have held that the use of a camera
may invade an individual's right of privacy. 41 In examining this use
of the camera, courts have looked at the location of the taking of
the photograph, 42 the conduct of the photographer, 43 and the content of the photograph. 44 The consideration of these factors, as required in Prosser's four privacy torts, has distracted the courts from
the proper privacy analysis. 45 In order to define and resolve the
problems of overlapping, this comment examines photography
cases in these three categories: location of the taking, conduct of
the photographer, and content of the photograph.
Location
The location of the taking of the photograph has improperly
served as a dispositive test for identifying privacy invasions. Thus,
when the photograph was taken in a private place, an invasion of
privacy was held to exist.46 Conversely, if the photograph was
taken in a public place, there was no privacy invasion. 47 This
dictomous analysis, however, avoids the real single issue: did publi40. Id. As to whether one can prevent another from taking the picture,
litigation is scarce. However, the angry reaction of some people when their picture is taken is well known. Most times, these people do not even care whether
the photographer uses the photographs. Wagner, Photographyand the Right to
Privacy: The French and American Approaches, 25 CATH. LAW. 195, 196, 224
(1980).
41. Id. This action can only be raised under a statute or if the one claiming
the invasion objects to the use of the pictures. Id.
42. E.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942). See generally Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 347 (to distinguish private facts from public facts, courts often look to the location of the taking of the photograph).
43. E.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 348.
To avoid the pitfalls of the location test, or sometimes to augment it, courts
and commentators have also relied on a subject matter or "zone of privacy"
test. Embarrassing events sometimes occur over which the individuals involved have little control, but which are undisputably public under the location test.
Id. For purposes of this article, "photographer" will be used for the taker of the
photograph as well as the user of the photograph. For example, the editor of a
newspaper or the assignee of the rights to the photograph would be included.
44. E.g., Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
45. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
46. E.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (photographers took pictures in plaintiff's home surreptitiously); Deaten v. Delta Democrat Pub. Co., 326 So. 2d 471 (Miss. 1976) (photographer took pictures of public
class of mentally retarded children); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159
S.W.2d 291 (1942) (photographers took pictures of plaintiffs over objections);
Yoeckel v. Samoning, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956) (tavern owner took
photograph of plaintiff in women's restroom).
47. E.g., Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933)
(photograph taken at airport). See Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 347. Under a
location analysis, information obtained about an individual in public is not pri-
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cation of the photograph reveal one's private character sufficiently
to arouse emotion or cause loss of dignity? If the answer is in the
affirmative, courts should find that an invasion of privacy occurred.
The answer to this question should be dispositive regardless of the
location of the taking. The inherent difficulties with using a location analysis as a determinative factor is illustrated by the following
cases.
In Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,48 a West Coast herbal medicinalist
refused to be photographed in his home-laboratory-garden. 49 A reporter and a photographer, under false pretense, gained entrance to
Dietemann's home and took pictures with a hidden camera without
Dietemann's consent. 50 Dietemann sought recovery for invasion of
privacy. 51 The court found that, although the photographer was invited into the home, Dietemann should not be required to bear the
risk that what was seen would be conveyed by photograph to the
public at large.52 The court based its decision on the private location of the taking of the photographs, yet found it necessary to justify its decision by alluding to the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and by describing the photographer's conduct as
53
"intrusive."
Importantly, the court examined the use of the photographs
under a stricter scrutiny than that which would have been employed with the oral medium of expression. The difference between mediums of expression, however, is inconsequential.
Essentially, they both perform the same function: communication
of thoughts and ideas. Therefore, the fact that the form of expression was a photograph rather than the spoken word should not have
made a difference, and the level of scrutiny used should have been
the same.
Dietemann, however, would not have been without a remedy
for lack of a privacy action. One obvious alternative is an action for
trespass. 54 A visitor who is an invitee as to one part of the premises
may become a trespasser if he goes to other parts of the premises
beyond the scope of the invitation. 55 Although Dietemann invited
vate. Such reportings are not invasions merely because the information was
further publicized. Id.
48. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
49. Id. at 246.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 248-49.
54. E.g., Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 370 (1835). "From
every ... entry against the will of the possessor, the law infers some damage."
Id.
55. Whelan v. Van Natta, 382 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1964). In Whelan, the plaintiff bought cigarettes in defendant's grocery store. Plaintiff asked for an empty
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the reporters into his home, it was for the limited purpose of treatment.56 The defendants in Dietemann exceeded the scope of their
invitation when they entered plaintiff's home under false pretense.
An action for trespass here would have been harmonious with the
law of owners and occupiers. 57 It would also have afforded
Dietemann a sufficient remedy without diluting the privacy tort.
By contrast, in Galella v. Onassis,58 a freelance photographer
stalked the widow of a United States President with his camera in
public. 59 In his aggressive pursuit to photograph Jacqueline Onassis, Galella jumped from concealed locations, followed her at close
distances, and made strange grunting noises. 60 Onassis filed suit
61
seeking injunctive relief against the photographer's interference.
The court found Galella liable for a number of torts,62 including
box. The defendant told him he could find some in the back room. The back
room was dark and plaintiff fell down the stairs. Plaintiff was an invitee when
he entered the store, and when he went into the back room he became a licensee and was afforded a lesser degree of care. Id.
56. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). The Life magazine reporter and photographer gained access to Dietemann's home by pretending to be a friend of a friend. Dietemann believed he was examining one of
them for breast cancer. Id. at 248.
57. Whelan v. Van Natta, 382 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1964). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 57-64 (5th ed. 1984).

58. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
59. Id. at 991-92.
60. Id. at 992. Galella considers himself a paparazzo. Literally, that is an
annoying insect. Paparazzi act offensively to their subjects in order to elicit
photographable poses and to aid in their advertising. Id.
61. Id. Initially, it was alleged that Onassis asked her secret service men to
intervene on her behalf. Galella brought a plea for an injunction against Onassis' interference with his making a living. Onassis then filed her counterclaim.
62. Galella v. Onassis 353 F. Supp. 196, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd in part
rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). Galella was found liable for assault.
Civil assault is the placing of another in apprehension of a battery. Physical
harm is not necessary. Therefore, Galella's jumping out at Onassis, and following her at close distances constituted civil assault. In addition to assault, Galella
was liable for battery. A civil battery is an intentionally offensive contact. In
certain circumstances, Galella flicked Onassis with a camera strap and bumped
into her to constitute a battery. The court also found Galella's conduct extreme, intentional and outrageous and that Onassis' emotional distress was severe enough for Galella's conduct to constitute intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Finally, the court found Galella in violation of the New
York harassment statute. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25 (McKinney 1980) provides:
A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or
alarm another person:
1. He strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physical contact,
or attempts or threatens to do the same; or
3.

He follows a person in or about a public place or places; or

5. He engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which
alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate
purpose.
Galella, 353 F. Supp. at 227.

1985]

Privacy In Photographs

invasion of privacy, despite the fact that the photographs were
taken in public places. 63 In granting relief, the court restricted
Galella's taking and selling of his pictures. 64 Galella's published
photographs, however, revealed only what had already been seen
many times in public. 65 If a wrong had existed, it was in the photographer's conduct and more appropriately remedied under assault,
66
battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Because privacy has been so expanded as to encompass elements of both trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress, Dietemann and Onassis were able to recover under invasion
of privacy. Privacy, however, must be limited in order to allow for
the normal application of, and protection afforded by the other
torts. As long as privacy serves as a catch-all, use of other torts,
such as trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress, will
become increasingly stagnant. If the privacy interest of personal
dignity is ever to achieve its intended independent status, the right
67
to privacy must not be merged with other torts.
This independent status is not only important for the natural
growth of other torts, but would also serve as a distinct guideline
for photographers to follow. A beginning professional photographer is instructed to shoot freely in public places and on public
property.68 Whether photographing a public figure or a private citizen, photographers assume they may shoot anything, anywhere in
63. Id. The court observed:
Continuously [Galella] has had [Onassis] under surveillance to the point
where he is notified of her every movement. He waits outside her residence at all hours. He follows her about irrespective of what she is doing:
trailing her up and down the streets of New York, chasing her out of the
city to neighboring places and foreign countries when she leaves for recreation or vacation, haunting her at restaurants (recording what she eats),
theatres, the opera and other places of entertainment, and pursuing her
when she goes shopping, getting close to her at the counter and inquiring of
personnel as to her clothing purchases. His surveillance is so overwhelmingly pervasive that he has said he has not married because he has been
unable to 'get a girl who would be willing to go looking for Mrs. Onassis at
odd hours.'
Id. at 227-28.
64. Id. at 241. The district court held that Galella could not go within 100
yards from the defendant's home, 100 yards from the children's schools and at
all other places, 75 yards from the children and 50 yards from the defendant.
Id. The court of appeals modified these distances leaving no restriction from
her home, restrictions only from entering schools and play areas and, at all
other places, 25 feet from the defendant and 30 feet from the children. Galella,
487 F.2d at 998.
65. Onassis was a public figure. Her picture and features are well known
throughout the country.
66. See supra note 62.
67. Warren and Brandeis intended the right to privacy to be a distinct, independent right of an individual. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1.
68. K. KOBRE, PHOTOJOURNALISM: THE PROFESSIONALS' APPROACH at 317
(1980).
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public.69 As Galella makes clear, though, courts do not always
agree. 70 As a result, photographers unfamiliar with the law of privacy have no practical guidelines within which to pursue their
livelihood.
Conduct
In many instances, courts have found that the photographer's
conduct while taking the picture may constitute the wrong, rather
than the photograph itself or the subsequent publishing. 71 To ensure that the interests of emotion and dignity are protected, rather
than those interests more appropriately protected by causes of action for other torts, the photograph and its contents must be viewed
as the wrong. An analysis of the following conflicting cases clarifies
the distinction between the photographer's conduct and the resulting photograph.
In FloridaPublishingCo. v. Fletcher,72 Cindy Fletcher died in a
fire at her home in Jacksonville, Florida. 73 Her mother, away at the
time, learned of her daughter's death in the local newspaper. 74 Accompanying the story was a photograph showing where the burned
body had left a silhouette on the floor. 75 The picture was taken by a
newspaper photographer who entered the home at a policeman's
76
invitation.
Mrs. Fletcher sued the Florida Publishing Company alleging
that the photographer had invaded her home without her consent,
and therefore violated her right to privacy. 77 The court found it
was common practice for a photographer to enter private premises
for the purpose of covering a newsworthy event, and therefore dis78
missed the suit.

69. Id.
70. E.g., Gallella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Cape Publications,
Inc. v. Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (photograph taken in
public held to be an invasion of privacy). See generally Zimmerman, supra note
29, at 347 (location as a means of defining private information).
71. E.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (photographer's
"paparazzi" conduct); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (photographer's surreptitious conduct).
72. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
73. Id. at 915.
74. Id.
75. The police requested this picture in order to evidence the fact that the
body was lying there before the fire did any damage to the room. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Had the police not invited the photographers in, they still could have
entered. Only the owner or occupier may exclude newsmen from entering
premises. The police, however, may exclude photographers while a search is
being conducted. People v. Berliner, 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1942 (N.Y. 1978).
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Conversely, in Barber v. Time, Inc.,79 the plaintiff, a patient in
a hospital, sued the defendant newspaper company for invasion of
privacy because it had taken and published her picture without her
permission.80 The newspaper claimed that the newsworthiness of
the patient's illness, an insatiable appetite, justified the taking.8 1
The court, however, found that the photograph was an invasion of
the plaintiff's privacy because the patient had refused to be
82
interviewed.
These cases illustrate that some courts are primarily basing the
invasion of privacy on the photographer's conduct rather than on
the photograph itself or the emotion stemming from the taking or
publication. In Fletcher,s3 the plaintiff did not invite the photographer into her home;8 4 the contents of her home were private. Without Mrs. Fletcher's consent, the police exceeded the scope of their
duties8 5 when the photographs taken for the police investigation
were allowed to be used in the newspaper. 86 Had the court properly
looked to Mrs. Fletcher's interests in privacy, rather than at the
photographer's conduct, it would have found the published photograph invaded Mrs. Fletcher's privacy.8 7 However, because the
court looked merely at the photographer's conduct, and determined
it to be reasonable, the court concluded that no privacy invasion
occurred.88
In contrast, the Barber court found the photographer's conduct
objectionable because the photographs were taken against the patient's will as she lay in her hospital bed.8 9 Although the court incorrectly found that the photographers were in a private room, the
crucial question was what was the appropriate cause of action. Pri79. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
80. Id at 1200, 159 S.W.2d at 292.
81. Id. at 1204, 159 S.W.2d at 295. Newsworthiness is a very broad defense
which protects the publisher. For legal purposes, newsworthiness does not
cover everything that an editor elects to print. See generally Bezanson, Public
Disclosuresas News: Injunctive Relief and Newsworthiness in Privacy Actions
Invoking the Press, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1979).
82. Barber, 348 Mo. at 1205, 159 S.W.2d at 296.
83. Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
84. Id. Mrs. Fletcher was not at home when the police invited in the photographer. Id. at 915.
85. For an explanation of special purpose relationships and how privacy is
involved, see infra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
86. The police photographer had problems with his equipment so the newspaper photographer was asked to take the pictures for the purpose of evidence.
Fletcher,340 So. 2d at 915.
87. Although the photograph sparked feelings and emotions in Mrs.
Fletcher, the feelings did not result from the disclosure of unknown facts to the
public. Mrs. Fletcher's anguish, however, constituted emotional distress for
which the publisher was liable. Id.
88. Id. at 918.
89. Barber,348 Mo. at 1205, 159 S.W.2d at 296.
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vacy should not have been the answer because the information published was already in the public domain. 90 The elements of
trespass 91 and intentional infliction of emotional distress,92 however, were present. Whenever severe mental pain and anguish occur through intentional harassment or intimidation, the
appropriate cause of action is intentional infliction of emotional distress.93 For an invasion of privacy to have occurred, the photographs and their subsequent publishing must have revealed private
facts and induced emotion or a loss of dignity. The Barber court's
decision based upon the photographer's conduct, therefore, protected Barber from other intentional torts under the guise of protecting her right to privacy.
The preceding cases distinguish the photographer's conduct
from the contents of the photograph. They confuse the issue in that
the photographer's conduct is not the privacy-invading factor. 94 It
is the content of the photograph which must be the form of expression that invades one's privacy by revealing private facts.
Content

Privacy-invading and non-privacy-invading content are often
difficult to differentiate. Protection should be afforded only for
truly private content that causes emotion or loss of dignity. Some
courts, however, have considered the issue of invasion solely on the
subject matter of the photograph. 95 These decisions have not considered whether the emotion stems from content revealing facts not
known to the public or simply the subject matter of the content on
strictly moral grounds.
90. Id. Barber's condition had attracted media attention. Nothing private
was revealed through the photographs. Id.
91. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
92. See Mead, Suing MediaForEmotional Distress: A Multi-MethodAnalysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASHBuRN L.J. 24 (1983). Infliction of emotional

distress overlaps the fields of defamation and privacy. Mead analyzes the the-

ory that privacy will be supplanted by the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
93. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 569, 255 N.E.2d 765, 770,
307 N.Y.S. 2d. 454, 459 (1970).
94. Neither the reasonableness of the photographer's conduct in Fletcher,
nor the objectionableness of the photographer's conduct in Barber effected any
revelation of private facts. Thus, the court's use of conduct as the determining
factor was incorrect. An individual is more properly protected from another's
objectionable conduct through causes of action for other intentional torts.
95. E.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474
(1964) (photograph of a woman in fun house with skirt blown up); Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (photograph of a
woman naked except for a hand towel). See also Zimmerman, supra note 29, at
348. The problem with the subject-matter test is that it is impossible to determine ahead of time the different events that could occur. Thus, publishers still
suffer from uncertainty when deciding which photographs are publishable. Id.
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In Cape Publications,Inc. v. Bridges,96 for example, a woman

was photographed wearing only a hand towel as she escaped from
the clutches of her estranged husband.97 She sued and a jury found
the publisher liable because the embarrassment of the woman outweighed any possible public interest. 98 The court disregarded the
fact that the photograph was taken in a public place and that the
conduct of the photographer in obtaining the photograph was reasonable. 99 Rather, it found the content alone to be beyond the
bounds of decency100

The event in Cape Publicationsoccurred on a public street. 0 1
102
The photograph only revealed what many had already seen.
Thus, the photograph did not reveal any "private" matters, and
therefore no privacy invasion was involved. It is not to say, however, that Bridges had no remedy. The publication of the photograph and ensuing distress may have given rise to intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress.10 3 Nevertheless, the matter published was already in the public domain and no invasion of
privacy should have been found. Content should not be analyzed on
the basis of morality. Invasion of privacy is not based upon moralistic considerations. 10 4 Content should be only one consideration in
determining whether the published facts were private.
PRIVACY PROPOSALS

Location, conduct, and content are all factors courts have considered in determining privacy violations through photographs. As
previously discussed, they are inadequate to properly determine
whether privacy violations have occurred. Therefore, the question
becomes under what circumstances can a plaintiff bring a cause of
action for invasion of privacy concerning photographs. This section
96. 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
97. Id. at 438. The husband had ordered the woman to disrobe and he then
beat her prior to his committing suicide. As the police escorted the woman out
of her home, the photographer snapped the photograph. The entire event had
attracted much media coverage. Id.
98. Id. at 440. The court based its decision on Prosser's tort of publishing
private embarrassing facts.
99. Id. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 348. Information regarding an individual obtained in public cannot be private. Further publication
does not create an invasion of privacy. Id.
100. Cape Publications,Inc., 387 So. 2d at 440.
101. Id. at 438.
102. Id.
103. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (5th
ed. 1984). Recently, infliction of emotional distress has served as a separate and
independent basis of action. Reluctance to advance infliction of emotional distress as a separate category was a result of its being considered too speculative
to be measured. Id.
104. See supra notes 12-33 and accompanying text.
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identifies those actions which may be protected under the privacy
tort: breach of special relationship, false statements, and appropriation.
Breach of Special Relationships
Certain special relationships call for immunity from suit for invasion of privacy. Where the bounds of this relationship are exceeded, however, there can be an invasion of privacy. The specific
purpose of the picture and the use to which it is put dictate whether
protection should be given.
One example of a special relationship allowing for photographing without consent is that of the doctor and patient. 10 5 A doctor
may photograph his patient for purposes of treatment without his
patient's consent.' 0 6 If the doctor does so for purposes other than
treatment over the patient's objections, then the patient may recover for invasion of privacy.10 7 Another such special relationship
is between the employer and employee.10 8 Where the employer has
a legitimate purpose in photographing his employees, it will not be
held as an invasion of privacy. L0 9 However, where no legitimating
105. Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976). Contra Clayman
v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940) (distribution or publication of patient's
photograph taken by doctor was not necessary for liability). But cf McAndrews
v. Roy, 131 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1961) (doctor took photographs with consent,
then published the pictures 10 years later without consent); Griffin v. Medical
Society, 7 Misc. 2d 549, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (doctor published
pictures in medical journal without consent). See generally Challener, The Doctor.PatientRelationshipand the Right to Privacy,11 U. PiTT. L. REV. 624 (1950)

(doctor-patient relationship requires utmost good faith and non-disclosure);

Wagner, Photographyand the Right to Privacy: The Frenchand American Approaches, 25 CATH. LAw. 195 (1980).
106. Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976).
107. Id. In Estate of Berthiaume, a doctor photographed a dying man over
his objections. The doctor had taken several photographs over the course of the
man's illness as a part of his record. The doctor said the pictures would help
him in evaluating similar conditions. Even though the photographs were for a
beneficial purpose, the patient had a right to determine whether the picture
should be taken. It was the taking that was being objected to, not the publishing. The court here limited the taking of photographs. Id.
108. E.g., Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (D. Ky. 1962) (employer's photographs did not violate employee's right to privacy); De Lurvy v.
Kretchmer, 66 Misc. 896, 322 N.Y.2d 517 (1971) (employer could take pictures of
employees to identify those unlawfully collecting waste for remuneration).
109. Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (D. Ky. 1962). In Thomas,
the employer took motion pictures of his employees to increase efficiency and
to promote safety. The employee complaining of invasion of privacy sought
damages of one dollar and an injunction prohibiting the employer from taking
further pictures without his consent. The plaintiff argued that the employer's
right to photograph was inferior to the employee's right to privacy when it
would affect health, welfare or homelife. The employer won. Even if the plaintiff's assertions were correct, he would have lost because he did not testify that
the filming had such an effect. Id.
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purpose exists, an invasion of privacy may follow.110 Police photographs also fall within this special relationship category., n In People v. Milone, n 2 for example, the court held that it was not an
invasion of the defendant's privacy to photograph his teeth to be
used in evidence.1 1 3 Photographs were necessary for identification
purposes because the defendant had left his teeth impressions on
the victim.'1 4 In York v. Story,1 1 5 however, a woman went to the
police station because she was assaulted. 1i 6 She was asked to undress and was photographed in the nude. l1 7 Her picture was then
circulated among policemen.11 8 The court found an invasion of privacy occurred because the police violated the trust between themselves and the victim. n 9
Thus, as long as the use of the photograph does not exceed the
bounds of the special purpose relationship, there is no invasion of
privacy. However, if the use of the photograph exceeds the special
purpose, then an invasion of privacy occurs.
110. Id.
111. E.g., People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976) (police
photograph used in evidence).
112. 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976).
113. Id. The defendant relied on Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Rochin held that the techniques amounted to an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy. In Rochin, the Supreme Court ruled that the act of pumping a defendant's stomach against his will was shocking and replusive, and therefore an invasion of his right to privacy. Id. In Milone, the court said that the procedures
used by the dentist were standard and such matters did not invade the defendant's right to privacy. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 386, 356 N.E.2d at 1352.
114. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 398, 356 N.E.2d at 1360.
115. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
116. Id. at 452.
117. Id. The woman objected, asserting that there was no need for the photographs because the bruises would not show up anyway. The policeman, however, advised her that it was necessary and directed her to assume various
indecent positions. A policewoman was present in the police station but was not
in the room where the photographs were taken. Id.
118. Id. The policeman later told the woman that the photographs did not
turn out and that he destroyed them.
119. Id. The last two paragraphs of plaintiff's complaint read:
V. All of the acts of the defendants aforesaid were as police officers of
said Chino Police Department; but were in excess of their authority as such
police officers. Said acts violated and deprived plaintiff of her right to privacy and liberty and constituted an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to and prohibited by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and the Federal Civil Rights Act.
VI. The acts of the defendants aforesaid were committed unlawfully,
intentionally, maliciously and oppressively, with the further knowledge on
the part of the defendants that they were exceeding their authority as police officers and with the further knowledge that they were depriving the
plaintiff of rights guaranteed to her by the Constitution of the United
States and by the Federal Civil Rights Act by virtue whereof the plaintiff is
entitled to punitive and exemplary damages.
Id. at 452 n.4.
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All these examples involve relationships for a limited purpose.
The same test may be applied to each limited purpose relationship.
As long as the photograph furthers the purpose of the relationship,
the photograph should not be held to be an invasion of privacy. If
the photograph is for diagnosis, for example, it is permitted. However, if the photograph is for teaching students or for educational
journals, the consent of the patient must be obtained. Such use
otherwise exceeds the bounds of the relationship and constitutes an
invasion of privacy for which protection must be given.
False Statements

When a photograph is coupled with words giving a false view of
120
the subject of the photograph, an invasion of privacy occurs.
When someone is put in a false light, feelings and emotions surface
which indeed should be protected. 12 1 For example, a picture of a
child who was hit by a car appeared in a newspaper. 2 2 In that particular instance, there could be no objection to publication of the
photograph. 23 Two years later, however, the Saturday Evening
Post ran the same photograph under the headline, "They Asked to
be Killed," in an article concerning child safety.' 2 4 The parents
claimed that the combination of words and photographs implied
carelessness on their part and placed them in a false light. 125 The
newspaper was held liable for creating the false impression. 126
In such instances, the photograph does not serve the purpose
for which it was initially taken. Rather, it is subsequently used in
conjunction with words to create a false statement. At first glance,
it appears that reputation is being affected and as such, a defamation suit should ensue rather than an action for invasion of privacy. 1 27 However, the differences between false light and
defamation require the separate torts. False light, unlike defamation, is not intentionally damaging to one's reputation, and truth is
no defense. i 28 Therefore, false light, as an aspect of the privacy
120. This is Prosser's tort of "false light." See Prosser, supra note 23, at 398.
121. Id. Prosser's false light tort, however, is based on reputation, which is
not a proper privacy interest. See Warren and Brandeis supra note 1.
122. Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
123. Id. at 975. The picture was a legitimate news story which outweighed
any claim to privacy.
124. Id. The Post had purchased the photograph from the publishing
company.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 978.
127. See Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093
(1962) (for a comparison of the two torts). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS §§ 111 to 116 (5th ed. 1984).
128. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984). See

Prosser, supra note 23, at 398. But see Kalven, Privacyin Tort Law-Were War-
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tort, protects the individual's private personality from disparagement created through the wrongful combination of photographs
and words.
Appropriation
Appropriation occurs when the photograph is used without
consent for the promotion of a product.'- 9 At its inception, appropriation was based upon the protection of a property interest stemming from the theory that there are property rights in facial
features. 130 Warren and Brandeis, however, were concerned with
protecting a person's right not to be connected with the promotion
of a product. 131 A photograph used in this way does more than
show the surface of one's features. It attempts to convey one's ideas
concerning a particular product and present an impression of one's
personality. Therefore, appropriation must also be retained as an
area for protection of private feelings under invasion of privacy.
CONCLUSION
Privacy has been expanded far beyond its intended scope. The
privacy tort, as we know it, includes interests better protected
under other torts. Photographs must be analyzed closely to determine whether the matter is truly private. A singular consideration
of either location, conduct, or content is inadequate to determine an
invasion of privacy.
The suggested contours promote Warren and Brandeis' desire
to create a distinct and independent right to privacy. Breach of special relationship, false statements, and appropriation will properly
protect an individual from the revelation of private facts in photographs. Utilizing privacy in this way will give photographers guidelines, allow for the potential growth of other torts, and inhibit the
courts' determination of photography cases on an ad hoc basis.
The photograph can only reveal what has already been seen.
Nonetheless, confusion within the privacy tort has caused photographs to suffer a stricter scrutiny than most forms of expression.
In spite of this precedent, privacy must develop distinctly and inde-

ren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBs. 326, 339 (1966) (conceptual and practical difficulties in allowing a privacy action when the statement is
false).
129. Prosser, supra note 23, at 401. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
130. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-18.
131. Id. at 207. The protection granted is not for the property aspect but for
the personality aspect.
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pendently and the courts must realize that a picture is not worth
more than words.
CatherineA. Tomaszewski

